



DISCRIMINATORY CONDITION IN GRANT
TO CITY RECREATION COMMISSION
FOR PUBLIC PARK UPHELD
In 1929 the City of Charlotte and Barringer, a private citizen, con-
veyed land to a public corporation in charge of city recreation facilities
to be used for a municipal park.' Both deeds provided that if the park
should not be used exclusively by whites, the land would revert to the
grantors. In 1951 a group of Negroes petitioned the Commission for
access to the park in order to use the city's only municipal golf course,
whereupon the Commission sought a declaratory judgment as to the legal
consequences of allowing Negroes to use the course. The court held that
the Barringer grant had created a valid fee simple determinable which
would revert to the grantor automatically if Negroes were permitted to
use the golf course, but that the grant from the city would not revert if
the condition were breached since it was void as a violation of the four-
teenth amendment. Charlotte Park & Recreation Commission v. Barringer,
88 S.E.2d 114 (N.C. 1955).
A condition on an estate is void if the acts required to perform it are
contrary to law or public policy or are otherwise impossible to discharge; 2
and, if the condition is void, the estate is free of the condition.3 Thus,
where a grantor sold land to a railroad on the condition that the railroad
not build a station within three miles of a certain city, the court held the
condition void because the restriction was contrary to the best interests
of the public and the stockholders; 4 and, where a grantor gave land to a
college on condition that the land revert if the receipts therefrom were not
used for a perpetual fund, the condition was held void when it conflicted
with the charter of the college.5 Therefore, if the conduct required to carry
out the condition in the instant case-the Commission's excluding Negroes
from the golf course-is unlawful, the court should have declared the con-
dition void. The recent Supreme Court rulings in Mayor of Baltimore v.
Dawson 6 and Holmes v. City of Atlanta make it clear that a municipality
1. Two other grantors were parties in the action but the disposition of their
claims is not relevant to this Comment.
2. Keyser v. Calvary Brethern Church, 192 Md. 520, 64 A2d 748 (1949);
Fidelity Insurance, Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Fridenberg, 175 Pa. 500, 34 Atl.
848 (1896). See 1 T FrANY, REAL PROPERTY § 199 (3d ed. 1939).
3. See note 2 supra; 6 AmRICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.83 (Casner ed. 1952).
4. Jacksonville & Chicago R.R. v. Mathers, 71 Ill. 592 (1874).
5. Trustees of Eureka College v. Bondurant, 289 Ill. 289, 124 N.E. 652 (1919).
6. 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3128 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1955), affirming, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.
1955).
7. 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3128 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1955), reversing, 223 F.2d 93 (5th
Cir. 1955), affirming, 124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954).
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may not lawfully exclude Negroes from a public recreation facility, and, in
the light of these decisions the condition necessarily would have been void.
However, the Supreme Court had not stated its position when the instant
case was decided. At that time there was some authority for applying the
"separate but equal" doctrine to recreational facilities,8 but even under this
doctrine Negroes would be entitled to use municipal recreational facilities
if there were not "separate but equal" facilities available for them.9 Since
the City of Charlotte did not, in fact, have another municipal golf course, 10
the Commission could not lawfully exclude Negroes, and, therefore, the
court should have invalidated the condition.
In the instant case, the court ruled that, since the condition established
a determinable fee," if it were breached, title would revert automatically
to the grantor.'2 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated ' 3 that, since
the reversion took place "automatically," there was no state action in its
determination, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, and hence
no conflict with Shelley v. Kraemer.14 There, the Supreme Court in-
validated the use of state judicial power which gave effect to a discrimi-
natory agreement by enjoining a Negro from taking possession of land and
by divesting him of title to the land because the sale to him violated a re-
strictive covenant.15 The instant case may be highly significant because
8. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954), aff'd, 223 F.2d
93 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3128 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1955); see
Kansas City v. Williams, 205 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 900
(1954); Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974
(1954); Hayes v. Crutcher, 108 F. Supp. 582 (M.D. Tenn. 1952); Note, 34 NEB.
L. Rnv. 553 (1955); 7 AA. L. Rnv. 153 (1954).
9. See note 8 supra.
10. Instant case at 118.
11. For the characteristics of the determinable fee, see First Universalist Society
v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892); Hall v. Turner, 110 N.C. 292, 14
S.E. 791 (1892) ; 1 RESTATEmENT, PROPRTY §§ 23, 44 (1936) and comments thereto;
1 AMERcANi LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 2.6, 4.12 (Casner ed. 1952).
12. Instant case at 123. Although the court upheld the condition in the grant from
Barringer, it invalidated it in the grant from the City of Charlotte. The court gave
no explanation for distinguishing between the public and private grantors and there
does not seem to be one, for the acts required by the Commission to carry out the
condition are unlawful in themselves and do not derive their illegality from the nature
of the grantor. It is possible that in certain situations the character of the grantor
could make a difference. For example, if a private grantor and the state each granted
land to a private school with the condition that the school exclude Negroes, the
condition in the private grant would probably be valid but that in the public grant
void on the theory that the state's establishing such a restriction would be contrary
to the fourteenth amendment even though the performance itself might be legal.
13. Instant case at 123.
14. 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
15. The Court expanded this doctrine in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953), when it denied damages for breach of a racially restrictive covenant. But in
Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110
(1953), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), judgment vacated
on rehearing, 349 U.S. 70 (1955) the Court refused to extend Shelley to give the
victim of a discriminatory practice a cause of action for damages against a party
who had agreed to and abided by a discriminatory condition.
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it could open the way to the use of the determinable fee to replace the re-
strictive covenant, rendered virtually useless by Shelley, for excluding
Negroes from land.1 Subsequent litigation arising from the declaratory
judgment could originate in two situations: first, the reversioner might
seek court aid to obtain possession of his land; second, the reversioner,
having managed to gain possession by his own devices, might invoke his
"title" as a defense to a suit by the grantee, pr his successor in interest, to
eject him.17 The first type of suit closely resembles Shelley, both in the
position of the parties and the character of the remedy requested. A dis-
tinction might be attempted, however, on the theory that the court in so
acting is not enforcing the discriminatory condition, but merely removing
a person whose right to possession had terminated "automatically" when
the condition was breached. Such conceptualistic reasoning, however,
cannot hide the fact that the practical result of a court's granting such relief
would be to effectuate the discriminatory condition by exercise of state
power. The second type of case, in which a reversioner in possession sets
up his "title" as a defense, admittedly is more difficult. It will arise where
the grantor regains possession, either by a forceful entry Is or by moving
on the land after a voluntary abandonment.' 9 If a court recognizes "title"
in the grantor, it may feel compelled not to eject him in favor of one who
admittedly has no "title." Once again, however, this conceptualistic reason-
ing masks the true import of such a decision. It would be to effectuate
the discriminatory condition by allowing its breach to be used as a valid
defense in an action brought to eject the grantor. Thus, analyzed the case
appears contra to Clifton v. Puente,20 in which the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals, on the authority of Shelley v. Kraemer, struck down such a defense
on the theory that it is as much state action to "deny to a person a legal
right to which he would be entitled except for the covenant as it would be
to expressly command by judicial order that the terms of the covenant be
recognized and carried out." 2 ' Restated to cover the hypothetical case the
rule would read: it is unconstitutional for a state court to give effect to a
discriminatory condition either by granting to or leaving with the rever-
sioner rights based upon that discriminatory condition. If this rule were
16. See Note, 4 Ky. L.J. 151, 160-62 (1954), in which various devices that may
be used to avoid Shelley are considered.
17. Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) presents an
analogous situation. See text at note 20 infra.
18. Ibid.
19. It is likely in the instant case that the Commission would be in sympathy
with the grantor's wish to maintain segregated facilities; thus it is quite possible that
the Commission would voluntarily abandon the land in favor of the grantor. The
condition precedent of a payment of $3500 to the Commission could be easily satisfied.
Instant case at 118.
Although highly speculative, it is at least arguable that the act of abandoning
the park to the grantor might be state action contrary to the fourteenth amendment
inasmuch as by so doing the Commission would be contributing to the success of
the discriminatory practice.
20. 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
21. Id. at 274.
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used in the two cases posed to deny a remedy to the reversioner, the declar-
atory judgment in the instant case would be as devoid of legal consequence




DIRECTOR'S LIABILITY BROADENED TO INCLUDE
USURPATION OF OPPORTUNITY MERELY
ADVANTAGEOUS TO INVESTMENT TRUST
Defendant, a wealthy investor, who was president and director of an
investment trust, was offered personally and orally accepted certain patents
and all the stock of the exclusive licensee of those patents. He relayed
this offer to his investment trust, which was highly liquid and actively seek-
ing investment opportunities. He counseled purchase of the licensee alone,
advising that rejection of the patents would allow the trust to diversify its
holdings, and also that the patents might not prove as profitable as they
appeared.' In the course of an informal meeting of the board of directors
at defendant's home, the two other board members present voted to pur-
chase the licensee and to reject the offer of the patents; defendant did not
vote, nor was his presence necessary for a quorum 2 Thereupon in simul-
taneous transactions the patents were purchased by defendant and the
licensee by the trust; defendant then transferred the patents at cost to
others pursuant to a prearranged plan.3 A stockholder of the trust brought
a derivative suit asking for an accounting. The court found that defend-
ant, in purchasing the patents, had wrongfully appropriated a corporate
opportunity belonging to the trust, and that the rejection by the board in
the vote of the two directors did not make out a good faith defense because
the board was dominated. The finding of domination was based primarily
on the fact that, of those directors at the meeting, one recently had been
employed by a corporation controlled by defendant and the other was a
22. 334 U.S. at 13.
1. He pointed out that 75% of the licensee's business was composed of govern-
ment contracts the profits from which were subject to renegotiation. Transcript
p. 24, cited in Brief for Defendant, p. 13. Where the licensee and patents are in the
same hands there is some question as to whether royalties are an allowable expense
on renegotiation. 32 C.F.R. § 1459.8(4) (Supp. 1952).
2. Two constituted a quorum of the board of five under the by-laws of the
corporation. Letter from Henry M. Canby, Attorney for Defendant, to the Uni-
versity of Pensylvania Law Review, Sept. 27, 1955, on file in Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania Law School. The other directors were also named as
defendants; however, service was only had on one, and the theory of recovery as to
them was not clear. The defendant failed to brief the question so argument on
it was postponed. Instant case at 922. At a later meeting, the board of directors,
with defendant not voting, formally ratified the prior rejection by the Corporation
of the offer of the patents. Brief for Defendant, p. 15.
3. Transcript, pp. 73-74, 80, cited in Brief for Defendant, p. 13 n.3.
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member of the law firm which handled defendant's affairs. An accounting
was ordered.4  Greene v. Allen, 114 A.2d 916 (Del. Ch. 1955).
The traditional doctrine of corporate opportunity imposes liability upon
a director for a purchase where the corporation has an "existing interest"
in the thing purchased, or where the opportunity is "necessary for cor-
porate existence or prosperity." 5 These labels are not susceptible of
precise definition, but liability has been found, for example, where a director
has purchased the renewal of a lease on property being used by the cor-
poration,6 a patent under which the complaining corporation had been
operating, 7 or water rights which interfered with the enjoyment by the
corporation of water rights in the same stream.8 Where the opportunity
is one which would be merely "advantageous" to the corporation, rather
than one in which it has an "existing interest" or which is "necessary for
corporate prosperity," the courts have found liability only in those cases
where the purchase by the director is accompanied by some abuse of his
position.9 Abuse of position is usually predicated upon such evidence of
disloyalty as the use of corporate funds,10 credit,"- name,12 facilities or
4. The basis for the accounting is not clear. In this sort of situation, a director
can be charged as a constructive trustee of the property and compelled to surrender
it. 3 Sco r, TRusTs §§ 479, 499 (1939). However, defendant was not in possession
of the patents. The patents may be reached in the hands of a transferee unless he
is a bona fide purchaser. Id. § 470. The transferees in the instant case could not
have been made parties to the action because it was not possible for the Delaware
court to acquire jurisdiction over them. Letter from Milton Paulson, Attorney
for Plaintiff, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Dec. 14, 1955, on file
in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Since the com-
plaint sought a decree "directing . . . defendant to cause the transfer to Airfleets
of said patents . . . " (ibid.) it apparently was the expectation of the plaintiff that
defendant was in a position to reacquire the patents from the subsequent purchasers
and have them turned over to the corporation.
5. See, e.g., Carper v. Frost Oil Co., 72 Colo. 345, 211 Pac. 370 (1922) ; Guth
v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Blaustein v. Pan
American Petroleum & Transport Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1st
Dep't 1941), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944).
6. Westerly Theater Operating Co. v. Pouzzner, 162 F.2d 821 (1st Cir. 1947);
McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 103 (8th Cir. 1906); Lagarde v. Anniston
Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900).
7. Farwell v. Pyle-National Electric Headlight Co., 289 Ill. 157, 124 N.E.
449 (1919); Averill v. Barber, 53 Hun 636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889).
8. Nebraska Power Co. v. Koenig, 93 Neb. 68, 139 N.W. 839 (1913).
9. Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900);
Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 49 P2d 429 (1935); Lancaster
Loose Leaf. Tobacco Co. v. Robinson, 199 Ky. 313, 250 S.W. 997 (1923); Greer
v. Stannard, 85 Mont. 78, 277 Pac. 622 (1929); Bancroft v. Olympia Coal & Mining
Co., 117 Wash. 211, 200 Pac. 1081 (1921); Tierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co.,
85 W. Va. 545, 102 S.E. 249 (1920). But see Production Machine Co. v. Howe,
327 Mass. 372, 99 N.E.2d 32 (1951).
10. Fleishhacker v. Blum, 109 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 665
(1940); Balch v. Investors' Royalty Co., 7 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Okla. 1934);
Bardeleben v. Bessemer Land & Improvement Co., 140 Ala. 621, 37 So. 511 (1904) ;
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
11. Goodhue Farmers' Warehouse Co. v. Davis, 81 Minn. 210, 83 N.W. 531
(1900); Memphis & Arkansas City Packet Co. v. Agnew, 132 Tenn. 265, 177 S.W.
949 (1915).
12. Central Ry. Signal Co. v. Longden, 194 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1952);
Chicago Flexotile Floor Co. v. Lane, 188 Minn. 422, 247 N.W. 517 (1933).
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employees, 18 or knowledge gained through directorship 14 in developing op-
portunities for personal gain. Courts likewise have held that the purchase
of an opportunity which the director specifically was authorized to acquire
for the corporation will result in liability for the director. 15 But, in the
absence of such indicia of abuse of position, the courts have uniformly held
that directors may invest in opportunities which would have been merely
advantageous for the corporation. 16
Since the patents were not "necessary" for the existence or prosperity
of the investment trust, and it did not have an "existing interest" in them,
the instant case represents an extension of the doctrine of corporate op-
portunity in that it holds that a director, although he has not abused his
position, is liable for taking for himself an opportunity which would have
been merely "advantageous" for his corporation. While the previous cases
have viewed corporate opportunity liability as a method of protecting the
existing investments of stockholders, and preventing directors from using
the corporation to serve their individual ends, the court here takes the quite
different view that ". . . the rule of fiduciary conduct to be adopted
should tend to encourage action in behalf of the corporation .... 17
Several arguments support such an extension. First, the directors of a
corporation are those on whom the responsibility devolves of discovering
business opportunities which will enhance the earning power of the cor-
poration. In an economy characterized by a marked divorce of ownership
from management,' 8 with concomitant stockholder apathy, there should be
some means to stimulate a director to efforts on behalf of his corporation
at the expense of his personal profit. If he is permitted to compete with his
corporation as to those opportunities which the corporation could use to
advantage the chances that a director will be unselfish are remote. Though
it may be questionable whether the doctrine of the instant case will in fact
result in greater efforts by directors for their corporations, at least it will
remove the conflict of interest when an opportunity comes to a director
which could be advantageous for his corporation.' 9 Second, often invest-
ment opportunities will come to the director of an investment company
because of a reputation gained through his stewardship of other people's
money, and it seems unjust to let him profit a t the expense of those whose
money was necessary to the creation of the reputation which attracted the
offer.
13. Central Ry. Signal Co. v. Longden, supra note 12; Goodhue Farmers'
Warehouse Co. v. Davis, 81 Minn. 210, 83 N.W. 531 (1900).
14. Nebraska Power Co. v. Koenig, 93 Neb. 68, 139 N.W. 839 (1913); Young
v. Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S.E_ 678 (1931).
15. Tobin Grocery Co. v. Spry, 204 Cal. 247, 267 Pac. 694 (1928); Beaudette
v. Graham, 267 Mass. 7, 165 N.E. 671 (1929); McKey v. Svenson, 232 Mich. 505,
205 N.W. 583 (1925).
16. See note 9 supra. See generally Notes, 39 CoLuI. L. REV. 219 (1939), 54
HARV. L. REV. 1191 (1941).
17. Instant case at 919.
18. Bmu & MEANs, THE MoDERN CoRPoAloN AND PRIVATE PRoPERTY (1932).
19. As the court pointed out, to hold otherwise would be to let the director
pick and choose between himself and his corporation, keeping the most valuable
investments for himself. Instant case at 919.
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On the other hand the instant decision, in expanding the scope of
directors' liability, may give rise to several problems. This further cir-
cumscription of directors' activities seems unnecessary because it is unlikely
that a corporation will be hurt. In previous cases liability usually was
restricted to the kind of purchase which deprived the corporation of an
opportunity uniquely valuable for its business operations and the loss of
which virtually always prejudiced the corporation.20 If the opportunity
is merely "advantageous," the corporation is injured, if at all, only to the
extent that there were not available to it other equally advantageous offers.
Secondly, the instant rule may result in both the corporation and its direc-
tor losing the opportunity. Speed is often necessary in dosing favorable
transactions, especially in the investment field. But most boards of di-
rectors meet no more than once a month and a special meeting is fre-
quently impracticable. It is true that a director could purchase such an
opportunity and later offer it to the board. However, it is not likely that
he will be willing to risk his capital in purchasing such an opportunity
because he takes, in addition to normal investment risk, the gamble that if
the opportunity appears profitable at the subsequent board meeting, with
later and hence more complete information on its desirability, undoubtedly
the corporation might accept it. Conversely, the chances that the board
would accept what has developed to be a poor investment are remote. A
third matter worth consideration is whether extension of liability may deter
men of varied business interests, especially active financiers, from becoming
directors, thereby depriving' corporations of the expertise of such men.
This deterrent effect is most dearly seen in an investment trust, which
frequently, as here,21 has no particular predisposition as to type of invest-
ment with the result that there are few opportunities which a director can
take for himself with impunity, before rejection by an independent board.
Finally, there is no guarantee that the men who do become directors will
engage in greater efforts for their corporations rather than taking the safer
and easier course of inaction. Because of these considerations it is ques-
tionable whether in practice the instant rule will operate to benefit the
corporation and its stockholders.
Even where there is a finding that the asset purchased by the director
is a corporate opportunity he will be absolved from liability if he can
20. See notes 6-8 supra; American Investment Co. v. Lichtenstein, 134 F. Supp.
857 (E.D. Mo. 1955) ; see also, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503
(Sup. E 1939) (director of candy company held liable for purchase of syrup
making patents and enterprise) ; News-Journal Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So. 2d
741 (1941) (director held liable for purchase of vacant tract of land located at rear of
the building occupied by his corporation and used for ingress and egress to the back en-
trance of the building); Production Machine Co. v. Howe, 327 Mass. 372, 99 N.E2d
32 (1951) (director of corporation engaged in the manufacture of polishing machines
held liable for taking contract for the manufacture of saw sharpening machines for
his private corporation); Blake v. Buffalo Creek R.R., 56 N.Y. 485 (1874) (rail-
road directors held liable for purchasing rights of way along the projected route of the
railroad).
21. Instant case at 921.
1955]
428 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
maintain the burden of proving good faith in the transaction.22 Good faith
may be predicated upon a showing that the corporation was unable to take
the opportunity, as where it would be illegal for the corporation, 2 where
the corporation is insolvent,24 or where the third party refuses to deal with
the corporation.2 5 Good faith will be found also where the corporation was
unwilling to make use of the opportunity, as where it is the settled policy
of the corporation not to acquire the sort of property in question,26 where
the corporation has given up its negotiations, 27 or where the corporation
through its board of directors has rejected the opportunity.28 However,
permission by the board of directors may be ineffective where it is given
by those who share the profits of the usurpation,2 9 where the defendant
director's vote is necessary for a majority,30 or where it is found that the
defendant dominates the board.3 ' There is rarely direct evidence of domina-
tion,3 2 so the courts have inferred domination where the directors' decision
is untenable. If gross misconduct is authorized, whereby the corporation
sustains a positive injury, such as loss of its assets, the courts seem to rea-
son that the directors could not have made an independent judgment.3 3 In
the instant case domination could not be inferred from the decision alone
since the rejection was supported by some reasonable grounds 3 4 and no
22. See Solimine v. Hollander, 128 N.J. Eq. 228, 16 A.2d 203 (Ch. 1940);
Turner v. American Metal Co., 268 App. Div. 239, 50 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1st Dep't 1944).
23. Jasper v. Appalachian Gas Co., 152 Ky. 68, 153 S.W. 50 (1913); Thilco
Timber Co. v. Sawyer, 236 Mich. 401, 210 N.W. 204 (1926).
24. Presidio Mining Co. v. Overton, 261 Fed. 933 (9th Cir. 1919); Bentley v.
Hetrick, 104 N.J. Eq. 535, 146 Atl. 320 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929).
25. Bisbee v. Midland Linseed Products Co., 19 F.2d 24 (8th Cir. 1927); see
Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co. v. Davidson, 95 Mo. 467, 8 S.W. 545 (1888).
But see N.Y. Automobile Co. v. Franklin, 49 Misc. 8, 17, 97 N.Y. Supp. 781, 787
(Sup. Ct. 1905).
26. Lancaster Loose Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Robinson, 199 Ky. 313, 250 S.W. 997
(1923); Bump Pump Co. v. Waukesha Foundry Co., 238 Wis. 643, 300 N.W. 500
(1941).
27. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, 168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 (1933).
28. Cowell v. McMillin, 177 Fed. 25 (9th Cir. 1910) ; Turner v. American Metal
Co., 268 App. Div. 239, 50 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1st Dep't 1944); see Thilco Timber Co.
v. Sawyer, 236 Mich. 401, 210 N.W. 204 (1926); McDermott Mining Co. v.
McDermott, 27 Mont. 143, 69 Pac. 715 (1902).
29. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934).
30. Long v. Wilson Stove & Mfg. Co., 277 Ill. App. 57 (1934).
31. Pepper v. Addicks, 153 Fed. 383 (E.D. Pa. 1907); Miner v. Belle Isle Ice
Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892) ; accord, Hannerty v. Standard Theater Co.,
109 Mo. 297, 19 S.W. 82 (1892); Fowle Memorial Hospital Co. v. Nicholson, 189
N.C. 44, 126 S.E. 94 (1925).
32. But see Pepper v. Addicks, supra note 31 (board authorized large unsecured
loan to corporation controlled by defendant director, which was used exclusively for
defendant's benefit, and changed by-laws so as to impede stockholders from getting
information about the corporation's affairs; board members testified that they
acted solely on defendant's advice).
33. Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892) (director
caused board to make contract leasing to corporation at exorbitant rentals property
which he owned); accord, Hannerty v. Standard Theater Co., 109 Mo. 297, 19
S.W. 82 (1892) (board permitted forfeiture of a lease which was the entire corporate
property; property was purchased by defendant director.); see Globe Woolen Co.
v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918).
34. See note 1 supra.
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such positive injury resulted as in those cases where domination was based
primarily upon the untenability of the board's decision. The eco-
nomic relationship of the defendant to the other directors coupled with the
informality and location of the meeting at which the rejection took place
are suggestive of domination. It is not altogether clear whether the court
based its decision on these factors alone, and, if so, whether they should
have been conclusive. If other factors played a part in the finding it is un-
fortunate that they were not articulated so as to provide a guide for future
action by directors, especially in a situation where such broad liability is
imposed.
Criminal Procedure-
INDICTMENT UPHELD EVEN THOUGH FOUNDED
SOLELY ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE
Frank Costello pleaded not guilty to an indictment for federal income
tax evasion. At the trial, it was disclosed that the only prosecution wit-
nesses to appear before the grand jury had been three United States Treas-
ury agents who had no personal acquaintance with Costello or his affairs.
Costello's motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that there was
no competent evidence before the grand jury on which an indictment could
be predicated was denied. On appeal from his subsequent conviction
Costello assigned as error, inter alia, the trial court's refusal to dismiss
the indictment. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that it is immaterial
that only incompetent hearsay was adduced before the grand jury in sup-
port of the allegations of the indictment. United States v. Costello, 221
F. 2d 668 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 76 Sup. Ct. 48 (1955).
At common law it was said that a grand jury should receive only
legally competent evidence.' However, there is no agreement among the
states as to the effect which the receipt of incompetent evidence by a grand
jury should have upon the validity of an indictment. Some states refuse
to entertain any inquiry into the competency or sufficiency of the evidence
produced before the grand jury.2 Others will quash indictments founded
1. E.g., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18255, at 993 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1872); United States v. Reed, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16134, at 735 (C.C.N.D.N.Y.
1852). Lord Coke labeled as a "strangei conceit" the theory that one may accuse by
hearsay. 3 CoKE, INsT. 25 (1641). However, some English authorities held that,
because of its ancient character as a secret accusatory tribunal, the grand jury might
receive any evidence, regardless of its competency. E.g., Regina v. Bullard, 12 Cox
Cr. Cas. 353 (1872); Regina v. Russell, Car. & M. 247, 174 Eng. Rep. 492 (Ex.
1842); see 1 HoLDswoRTH, HisroRy OF ENGLISH LAw 147-48 (1903).
2. E.g., State v. Chance, 29 N.M. 34, 221 Pac. 183 (1923), and cases cited therein;
see AL MoDEL CODE OF CUiImrAL PRocFDuRE, commentary § 138 (1930). Cf. State
v. Shawley, 334 Mo. 352, 67 S.W.2d 74 (1933), indicating that Missouri will quash
indictments only if the grand jury heard no evidence at all.
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solely on incompetent evidence.8 Though many states have enacted statutes
limiting grand juries to the receipt of "legal evidence," 4 such statutes have
generally been interpreted as directory rather than mandatory.
5 The pre-
vailing rule in the federal courts has been that an indictment is not vitiated
merely because some incompetent evidence was received by the grand
jury,6 but an indictment founded solely on such evidence may be quashed
at the trial court's discretion.7 However, the body of rules surrounding
the exercise of this discretion provide so many opportunities for affirming
a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment that the circuit
courts only rarely have reversed such a denial., It is said that the trial
court's discretion is not ordinarily subject to review,9 that the defendant
must prove affirmatively that the grand jury heard no competent evidence
whatsoever,10 and that the defendant may not be aided in this effort by
granting an inspection of the grand jury minutes." A few of the federal
3. E.g., Dong Haw v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 2d 153, 183 P.2d 724 (1947) ;
People v. Derrico, 409 Ill. 453, 457, 100 N.E.2d 607, 610-11 (1951) (dictum) ; State
v. Choate, 228 N.C. 491, 496, 46 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1948) (dictum). Cf. People v.
Nitzberg, 289 N.Y. 523, 47 N.E.2d 37 (1943); People v. Nicosia, 164 Misc. 152,
298 N.Y. Supp. 591 (Kings Cty. Ct 1937), indicating that in New York an in-
dictment may be quashed for insufficient or incompetent evidence before the grand
jury even though there may have been some competent evidence.
4. E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. §43-918 (1947); CAL. Pm. CODE §919 (1949);
Ky. CRIm. CODE PRAC. ANN. § 107 (Carroll 1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.59
(West 1947); MONT. REV. CoDEs ANN. §94-6318 (1947); NEv. Co .. LAws
§ 10822 (1929); N.M. STAT. AiNN. § 41-5-22 (1953); N.Y. CODE Cum. PRoC. §256;
ORE. Rrv. STAT. § 132.320 (1953).
5. E.g., Murphy v. State, 171 Ark. 620, 286 S.W. 871 (1926); Commonwealth
v. Minor, 89 Ky. 555, 13 S.W. 5 (1890) ; Territory v. Pendry, 9 Mont 67 (1889).
Contra, People v. Brickner, 8 N.Y. Crim. 217 (1891). Where statutes specify the
reasons for which an indictment may be set aside, and the receipt of improper evi-
dence is not among these reasons, most states hold it immaterial that such evidence
was heard. E.g., State v. Pfeiffer, 35 Ariz. 321, 278 Pac. 63 (1929); State v.
DeGroate, 122 Iowa 661, 98 N.W. 495 (1904). But see People v. Glen, 173 N.Y.
395, 66 N.E. 112 (1903).
6. E.g., Gates v. United States, 122 F.2d 571 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 698 (1942); Murdick v. United States, 15 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1926);
United States v. Frontier Asthma Co., 69 F. Supp. 994 (W.D.N.Y. 1947). Contra,
United States v. Rubin, 218 Fed. 245 (D. Conn. 1914) ; United States v. Fitzpatrick,
16 Fed. 765 (W.D.N.C. 1883); United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 622, No.
14858 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
7. E.g., Nanfito v. United States, 20 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1926); United States
v. Farrington, 5 Fed. 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1881); cf. Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d
405 (8th Cir. 1928).
8. Only two cases have been found reversing convictions because of the evi-
dence received by the grand jury: Brady v. United States, 24 F2d 405 (8th Cir.
1928) ; Nanfito v. United States, 20 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1926).
9. See, e.g., Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896) ; Carrado v. United
States, 210 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1018, 1020 (1954), 349
U.S. 932 (1955); Lewis v. United States, 295 Fed. 441 (1st Cir. 1924). But see
United States v. Rosenthal, 121 Fed. 862 (S.D.N.Y 1903).
10. E.g., Cox v. Vaught, 52 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1931); Anderson v. United
States, 273 Fed. 20 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 647 (1921); Chadwick v.
United States, 141 Fed. 225 (6th Cir. 1905).
11. E.g., United States v. Skurla, 126 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1954); United
States v. Oley, 21 F. Supp. 281 (E.D.N.Y. 1937). But see United States v. Perl-
man, 247 Fed. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); cf. United States v. Lydecker, 275 Fed. 976
(W.D.N.Y. 1921).
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courts, like many of the states, permit no inquiry into the character of the
evidence before the grand jury.' The Second Circuit has disclosed a
marked antipathy toward efforts to dismiss indictments because of defects
in the grand jury's evidence, 13 but until the Costello case it had employed
the conventional theory that the defendant did not prove adequately the
total absence of competent evidence before the grand jury as grounds for
refusing to quash.14 The Costello decision now abandons all pretense of
requiring any competent evidence in support of indictments, and offers in
its stead the standard of whether there was "some evidence" before the
grand jury "that rationally established the facts." -l
Although the grand jury was originally conceived to inquire after
offenses and bring charges, 6 its investigative and accusatory functions have
been largely supplanted by the development of the public prosecutor.'
7
Thus, the primary remaining function of the grand jury is that of protect-
ing the accused from unfounded prosecutions.' 8 Two devices of the grand
jury system are designed for the accused's protection: the grand jury's
ultimate discretion to refuse to return a true bill,' 9 and a minimum standard
which the evidence before the grand jury must meet if the indictment is to
withstand successfully a motion to dismiss.20 The latter device, while
12. E.g., McKinney v. United States, 199 Fed. 25 (8th Cir. 1912) ; United States
v. Atlantic Commission Co., 45 F. Supp. 187 (E.D.N.C. 1942); United States v.
Swift, 186 Fed. 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1911); United States v. Brown, 24 Fed. Cas. No.
14671, at 1274 (D.C. Ore. 1871).
13. See United States v. Beadon, 49 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S.
625 (1931); United States v. Violon, 173 Fed. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); cf. United
States v. Herzig, 26 F.2d 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1928) ; United States v. Morse, 292 Fed.
273 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
14. E.g., Kastel v. United States, 23 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277
U.S. 604 (1928); United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923);
United States v. Gouled, 253 Fed. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
15. See instant case at 677. Whether such a broad reformulation of approach
was necessary to the result is perhaps open to question in view of recent decisions
supporting the competency of revenue agents' testimony in "net worth" tax prose-
cutions. E.g., Banks v. United States, 204 F.Zd 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 857 (1953), order vacated, 347 U.S. 1007 (1954), cert. granted, 348 U.S. 905
(1955); cf. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943). There is a possibility
that legally admissible documentary evidence was received by the grand jury. Brief
for Appellee, p. 44.
16. See POUND, CRIMINAL JusTIcE IN AMERcA 87, 109 (1945); Glaser, The
Political and Historical Development of the Grand Jury, 8 LAw Soc. J. 192, 197-202
(1938).
17. See MoL.EY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 127-48 (1929); Miller,
Informations or Indictnents it Felmy Cases, 8 MINN. L. REV. 379, 388 (1924);
Morse, A Survey of the Grand iury System, 10 ORE. L. Rnv. 101, 138 (1931).
18. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906) ; Elliff, Notes. on the Abolition
of the English Grand Jury, 29 J. CRrn. L., C. & P.S. 3, 4-6 (1938); McClintock,
Indictment by a Grand Jury, 26 MINN. L. REv. 153, 156-57 (1942); Glaser, supra
note 16, at 202-04.
19. One of the most celebrated instances of the exercise of this discretion is the
Earl of Shaftesbury's Case, 8 How. St. Tr. 759 (1681), in which the grand jury re-
turned an "Ignoramus" on the Crown's bill accusing the Earl of treason. For an
account of this and other famous 17th century incidents of grand jury resistance to
Crown pressure, see Kinghorn, The Growth of the Grand Jury System, 6 L. MAG.
& REv. 367, 371-81 (4th ser. 1880).
20. The cross-examination of witnesses by the grand jurors might be considered
a third device. See People v. Sexton, 187 N.Y. 495, 514, 80 N.E. 396, 402 (1907).
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ostensibly restraining the grand jury from the arbitrary return of indict-
ments, has its direct effect upon the prosecutor, who generally controls
the evidence presented before the grand jury.21 To evaluate the apposi-
tion of such a standard of evidence to contemporary circumstances and the
Costello rule as a particular expression of such a standard necessitates an
examination of the milieu in which the standard must operate. It seems
clear that the defendant under modern accusatory procedures need not
rely solely, or even substantially, on the grand jury to protect him from
the type of persecution which the grand jury system historically was in-
tended to guard against. For one thing, the customary practice of a pre-
liminary hearing before an examining magistrate 22 or, in the federal courts,
a United States Commissioner,2 insures that at least a prima facie case
exists against the accused prior to any consideration of the case by the
grand jury. Also, the political responsibility of the prosecutor and per-
sonal concern for a record of obtaining convictions are strong factors lead-
ing a prosecutor to refrain from seeking trial except where he believes he
has a legally sufficient case.2 4  In addition, the protection given the de-
fendant by the assurance of a public trial hedged about with modern due
process sanctions removes a large element of the rationale inherent in the
early concept of the grand jury as a bulwark against tyranny.2 5 At the
same time, considerations of administrative efficiency make extended judi-
cial review of the evidence received by the grand jury undesirable. Such
considerations include the burden on the courts if they are required to re-do
the work of the grand jury in addition to conducting trials, 26 the tactical
advantages accruing to defendants from pre-trial divulgence of the prosecu-
It has been contended that hearsay should be admitted before the grand jury because
a grand jury investigation is not an adversary proceeding and, therefore, neither
the accused nor his counsel is ordinarily present to cross-examine even first-hand
witnesses; thus the most prominent justification for the rule excluding hearsay is
not applicable. Instant case at 678. However, this particular argument seems to be
offset by the cross-examination of first-hand witnesses that is conducted by the
grand jurors themselves.
21. The accused has no right to appear before the grand jury. Duke v. United
States, 90 F.2d 840 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 685 (1937) ; see FED. R. CRns.
P. 6(d). The prosecutor is the only one present who can distinguish competent from
incompetent evidence. See United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765, 771-72 (W.D.N.C.
1883). In some states the accused is granted the right by statute to petition the
grand jury for a hearing. E.g., N.Y. CODE CRIm. Poc. § 257. Other jurisdictions
provide that the grand jury may hear the accused if the court so directs. E.g.,
State v. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95, 104-05 (1879).
22. See ALI MODEL CODE OF CRimIrAL PRocEDuma §§ 39-60 (1930) and commen-
taries thereto.
23. FED. R. CRxm. P. 5(c). The rule also provides that the defendant "... may
cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf."
24. For a discussion of the prosecutor's accusatorial discretion, see Note, Prose-
cutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REr. 1057, 1057-72 (1955).
25. This conception of the grand jury is strongly reflected in SoMERs, SEcurrY
OF ENGLISHMEN'S Livs (1766), first published in 1681 as a justification of the grand
jury's action in Shaftesbury's case.
26. See Note, Qwshing Federal Indictients Returned Upon Incompetent Evi-
dence, 62 HARv. L. Ray. 111, 114-15 (1948); United States v. Fitzgerald, 29 F.2d
573, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1928); United States v. Swift, 186 Fed. 1002, 1018 (N.D. Ill.
1911).
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tion's case,2 7 and the delay in proceeding to trial that would arise from
-extensive pre-trial hearings on motions to dismiss indictments. 28 Fur-
thermore, it seems undesirable to increase the workload of prosecutors, who
are faced with the duty of presenting evidence to grand juries in thousands
of cases each year,29 by compelling them to select their witnesses before
grand juries in accordance with stringent evidence requirements used in
trials before petit juries. In view of these administrative benefits derived
from a very limited judicial review of the grand jury's evidence and the
problematical necessity of such review for safeguarding the accused, it is not
surprising that the courts have generally been exceedingly reluctant to
scrutinize the evidence produced before the grand jury for adherence to a
standard of competency, probity or sufficiency.80
This judicial reluctance, combined with the customary rules against
disclosure of grand jury proceedings,31 has so impeded defense efforts to
enforce the existing standard of "some competent evidence" that the stand-
ard has been practically negated. Few defendants are able to establish
the incompetency of the evidence before the grand jury because the tradi-
tional secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings prevents the gathering
of proof. The defendant must have court permission to obtain testimony
of the grand jurors as to the evidence received.32 Although the federal
rules impose no obligation of secrecy upon grand jury witnesses,3 3 district
courts often require such oaths,8 4 in which case court permission likewise
is required for disclosure by the witnesses.35 Since most courts require
a clear and positive showing that the grand jury heard no competent evi-
dence as a prerequisite to interrogation of grand jurors8 6 or witnesses,37
27. See Kastel v. United States, 23 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied,
277 U.S. 604 (1928), 38 YALE L.J. 680, 681 (1929); 1 CHIT=Y, CIMINAL LAw
§317 (2d ed. 1826).
28. See United States v. Swift, 186 Fed. 1002, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 1911).
29. See DISTRCT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE OF PHILADELPHIA, ANNUAL REPORT 1952,
at 12 (1953).
30. The federal courts, like the states, permit no inquiry at all into the sufficiency
of the grand jury's evidence. United States v. Morse, 292 Fed. 273 (S.D.N.Y.
1922); United States v. Reed, 27 Fed. Cas. 727, No. 16134 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1852).
31. See United States v. Reed, 27 Fed. Cas., No. 16134, at 738 (C.C.N.D.N.Y.
1852). The historical secrecy of grand jury proceedings is intended to prevent the
public circulation of accusations prior to the commencement of prosecution. United
States v. Perlman, 247 Fed. 158, 160-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
32. Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940); United States v.
American Medical Ass'n, 26 F. Supp. 429 (D.D.C. 1939); FED. R. CRIm. P. 6(e);
cf. Atwell v. United States, 162 Fed. 97 (4th Cir. 1908) (secrecy not required after
indictment found, accused apprehended, and grand jury discharged).
33. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, NOTES TO THE
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DisTaIcr COUrTS OF THE UNITED STATES
7 (1945).
34. See Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939). The Supreme
Court's Advisory Committee characterized the seal of secrecy on witnesses as "an
unnecessary hardship" that "may lead to injustice." ADvisoRY CoMMITTEE ON
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 7.
35. United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1940).
36. See, e.g., United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 26 F. Supp. 429 (D.D.C.
1939).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 241 (N.D.
Ohio 1940).
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defense counsel is often faced with the nearly impossible task of first
proving the very fact which the testimony sought is needed to establish.
The same obstacle exists where the defense seeks inspection of the grand
jury minutes.38 Finally, even if convincing testimony is presented, the
defense must still overcome the unfavorable attitude of the courts toward
efforts to quash indictments, as illustrated by the recondite reasoning to
which the courts sometimes have resorted in rejecting defense proofs that
the grand jury heard no competent evidence.3 9 A realistic evaluation of
the impact of the Costello rule can therefore be made only by reference to
this practical context in which presumably it must operate. In this context
there are so many judicially-created obstacles to the dismissal of indict-
ments that the substitution of the Costello standard for the "some competent
evidence" standard can have little concrete effect. If the courts have proved
reluctant to enforce the standard of "some competent evidence" which,
though illogical at times, ° is at least ascertainable, then it is with some-
thing less than confidence that we may expect more rigorous enforcement
of so elusive a standard as Costello offers.
If we could assume, on the other hand, that the standard of evidence
would be effectively enforced, whether it be the existing standard or the
Costello standard, a choice between the two acquires some significance.
The existing requirement of a modicum of competent evidence affords the
accused, as Judge Hand points out in the Costello opinion, "an utterly
illusory protection."41 Under that standard an indictment can be sus-
tained if the grand jury heard the slightest competent evidence, however
unpersuasive, since the federal courts consistently have refused to review
the sufficiency of the grand jury's evidence.42 The Costello standard, while
dispensing with any requirement of technical evidentiary competency, does
require that the grand jury hear at least some evidence which is probative.
To that extent the accused under the Costello standard receives a more
realistic guarantee of protection against baseless prosecutions. It is true,
on the other hand, that the Costello standard removes any legal barrier
to the return of indictments founded solely upon evidence which is inad-
missible at trial.43 Insofar as the accused may thereby be subjected to the
38. See note 11 supra.
39. E.g., the highly technical reasoning used by the court in Radford v. United
States, 129 Fed. 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1904).
40. For criticism of the rule excluding hearsay, see, e.g., Robertson v. Hacken-
sack Trust Co., 1 N.J. 304, 318, 63 A.2d 515, 522-23 (1949) (concurring opinion);
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 626-34 (1954); 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
211-326 (1954) ; ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDEN c, Introductory Note to rules 501-31, at
217-24 (1942).
41. Instant case at 678.
42. See note 30 supra.
43. There is no federal statute regulating proceedings before the grand jury
or specifying the kind and degree of evidence necessary to the finding of a true
bill. Although a copy of the indictment must be given the defendant prior to
plea, FED. R. Cam. P. 10, and persons charged with capital offenses must be given,
in advance of trial, a list of the prosecution witnesses to be produced at trial and a
list of the veniremen, 18 U.S.C. §3432 (1952), there is no requirement, as in many
state statutes, that the names of the grand jury's witnesses be endorsed upon the
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hazard of trial without adequate justification, his protection is diminished
by the Costello rule. Nevertheless, implicit in the Costello standard of
evidence "that rationally established the facts" is the requirement that the
evidence before the grand jury not be completely lacking in probity and
reliability. This requirement, considered in view of the personal and
political responsibility of the prosecutor, provides a better-balanced guar-
antee against persecution than does the technical focus of the "some com-
petent evidence" rule.
That the rationale supporting the Costello standard is found in the
availability of protection for the accused from sources independent of the
grand jury, and in the need for administrative flexibility in our criminal
procedures, highlights the questionable utility of the grand jury in modem
circumstances. However negligible may be the impact of the Costello
rule in practice, it undoubtedly will provide an opportunity for renewed
discussion of the validity of the grand jury today.44
Criminal Procedure-
PERJURY NOT GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL
IN ABSENCE OF DILIGENT EFFORT TO
REBUT DURING TRIAL
Largely as a result of the testimony of Harvey Matusow, defendants
were convicted of conspiring to violate the Smith Act.1 Matusow subse-
quently proclaimed that the testimony which he had given at the trial
was false.2  On a motion for a new trial based on Matusow's recanting
affidavit and other evidence of his false testimony, the court found that the
witness had lied at the trial. However, without inquiring as to the possible
effect of this testimony on the jury's verdict, the court denied a new trial
to those defendants whose conversations with Matusow allegedly were
held in the presence of a third person or persons. The basis for this ruling
was that these defendants had not shown that properly diligent attempts
had been made at the time of the trial to find the third parties to refute
bill. See, e.g., ILL. ANAT. STAT. c. 78, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1935); OxiA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 384 (1937); ORE. REv. STAT. § 132.580 (1953); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-132 (1950).
44. For criticisms of the grand jury as serving no useful purpose and as being
a rubber stamp for prosecutors, see DisTaicr ArORNEY'S OFFICE OF PHILADELPHIA,
ANNUAL RIP'oRT 1952, at 40 (1953); Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System,
10 OaR. L. REv. 295, 329 (1931) ; NAaiONAL COmmISSiON ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEmENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 124-25 (1931). But see White, In Defense
of the Grand Jury, 25 PA. B.A.Q. 260 (1954); Dession, Fromrn Indictment to In-
formation--Implication of the Shift, 42 YALE L.J. 163 (1932). The grand jury
has been abolished in England as a useless relic. See Elliff, supra note 18.
1. 62 STAT. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1952).
2. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1955, p. 12, col. 5.
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the perjured testimony.3 United States v. Flynn, 130 F. Supp 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).4
It is well established that a new trial should not be granted auto-
matically upon the presentation of recanting affidavits or allegations of
falsity, but only with great caution.5 The disposition of the motion is
left to the discretion of the trial judge, and is reversed only for an abuse
of that discretion.6 The courts have established certain criteria by which
the exercise of this discretion is to be tested. In Martin v. United States,
7
the Fifth Circuit held that a new trial should be granted whenever there
has been a showing of falsity without which a conviction probably would
not have been obtained. One year later, the Seventh Circuit, in Larrison
v. United States,8 added to the Martin doctrine an additional requirement:
that the defendant must show that he was unable to meet the perjured
testimony at the trial.9 This rule, however, as applied in the Larrison case
was, at best, an alternative holding since it was not necessary for that
court's denial of the motion."0  In Gordon v. United States," the Sixth
Circuit suggested that the requirement added in Larrison should not be
applied, and in United States v. Miller,12 a New York federal district
court, without mentioning the Larrison rule, reverted to the Fifth Circuit
3. A new trial was granted to those defendants whose alleged conversations
with Matusow had been held in private. The court reasoned that, since the only
way these defendants could meet the perjured testimony was to take the stand, they
were not able to meet the testimony unless they abandoned their privilege not to
testify. The court was unwilling to abrogate that privilege, and ultimately concluded
that as to these defendants, the jury might have acquitted without Matusow's
testimony. Instant case at 421-22.
4. In Jencks v. United States, 6 CCH LAB. L. REP. (29 Lab. Cas.) 1 69523, at
90018 (5th Cir. Oct. 26, 1955), the court denied a new trial to defendant convicted
of perjury for filing a false non-communist affidavit required by § 9(h) of the Taft-
Hartley Act (61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1952)) upon a finding that
Matusow did not lie at the trial, and distinguished the instant case on the facts.
The court cited Matusow for contempt. Id. at p. 90014.
5. United States v. Hiss, 107 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 201 F.2d 372
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 US. 942 (1953); United States v. Miller, 61 F. Supp.
919 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); see also United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.
1954) ; Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1925) ; People v. Shilitano,
218 N.Y. 161, 112 N.E. 733 (1916) ; 37 Mlcii. L. REv. 1143 (1939) ; 39 MINN. L.
REv. 316 (1955). Compare FED. R. CRIm. P. 33: "The court may grant a new
trial to a defendant if required in the interest of justice. . . ." Note, however, that
when a prosecuting official suborns false testimony, due process of law is violated.
White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 106
(1935) (dictum).
6. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106 (1946); United States v. Troche,
213 F2d 401 (2d Cir. 1954); United States v. Johnson, 142 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.),
cert. disnissed, 323 U.S. 806 (1944); Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259 (2d
Cir. 1925) ; Pettine v. Territory of New Mexico, 201 Fed. 489 (8th Cir. 1912).
7. 17 F.2d 973 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527 (1927).
8. 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1929).
9. Id. at 88.
10. The court based its holding mainly on the fact that the witness had lied
in his recantation which he had repudiated by a subsequent affidavit. 24 F.2d at
88. See also Johnson v. United States, 142 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
323 U.S. 806 (1944).
11. 178 F.2d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 1949) (dictum).
12. 61 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
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rule that a showing of perjury which may have affected the outcome of the
case entitles the defendant to a new trial. Of those cases which have pur-
ported to follow the Larrison rule, virtually everyone has ruled that there
has not been material perjury, thus obviating the necessity of considering
the defendant's ability to meet the false testimony.13 The instant decision
is the first case in which a court has made the result turn on the issue
of whether or not the defendant was able to meet the perjured testimony.14
The instant case indicates that the defendant must act at the time of
the trial or waive his right to claim an improper conviction based on per-
jured testimony. This rule, at first, appears to be analogous to a waiver
for failure to assert a privilege 15 or to object to evidence amenable to
exclusionary rules.1 6  The analogy, however, is not a good one. Since
privileged testimony is usually of proper probative value, and hearsay evi-
dence is at least possibly true, courts do not wish to eschew the evidence
unless the party objects.17 On the other hand, perjured testimony, by
hypothesis, is false, and, therefore, there is no possibility that it could be
evidence of proper probative value. A closer analogy to the rule of Lar-
rison is the requirement of due diligence when newly discovered evidence
is offered as a basis of a motion for a new trial.' 8 Leading cases involving
13. See United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1954); Blodgett v.
United States, 161 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1947). Bub see United States v. Johnson, 149
F.2d 31, 44 (7th Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 327 U.S. 106 (1946), where the
court practically assumed that under the Larrison rule, defendant was unable
to meet the evidence discovered subsequent to the trial, and, therefore, a new trial
was granted.
14. Civil cases provide no definite guide on the "ability to meet" question on
motions for a new trial based on perjured testimony. Most of these cases have
been decided on the questions of whether or not there was perjury and whether
the absence of the perjured testimony would have changed the result. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Ross, 150 Ohio St. 448, 83 N.E.2d 222, 10 A.L.R.2d 377 (1948). Two
jurisdictions have taken a categorical stand in civil cases on the question presented
by the Larrison rule. Maine has ruled that a new trial will not be granted where
there is no showing of diligence. Boisvert v. Charest, 135 Me. 220, 193 Atl.
841 (1937). On the other hand, Kansas has ruled that a new trial will be granted
despite a lack of diligence, at least where the opposing party has committed the
perjury. Boxberger v. Texas Co., 156 Kan. 471, 134 P.2d 644 (1943); Scott v.
Southwest Grease & Oil Co., 167 Kan. 171, 176, 205 P.2d 914, 919 (1949) (dictum).
Pennsylvania courts have granted a new trial where a judgment has been obtained
through perjured testimony without mentioning a diligence requirement. Blake v.
Marinelli, 357 Pa. 314, 53 A.2d 550 (1947) ; Candelore v. Glauser, 291 Pa. 582, 140
AtI. 525 (1928); see also Hunter v. Thomas, 173 F2d 810, 812 (10th Cir. 1949).
15. E.g., the attorney-client privilege or the privilege against self-incrimination.
See McConIcK, EVIDENCE §§ 91-100, 120-36 (1954).
16. E.g., hearsay evidence. See McCoRmICK, EvIDNCE §§ 72 n.2, 223-29 (1954).
17. McCoRmiCK, EvIDNCE § 72 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (3d ed.'
1940).
18. Although recanting affidavits and evidence of false testimony may properly
be called "newly discovered evidence," People v. Shilitano, 218 N.Y. 161, 171, 112
N.E. 733, 736 (1916), the federal courts, for purposes of the disposition of the
motion, distinguish the rules applicable to each. United States v. Marachowsky,
213 F.2d 235, 238 (7th Cir. 1954); United States v. Johnson, 142 F.2d 588, 592
(7th Cir.), cert. dLmnissed, 323 U.S. 806 (1944) ; United States v. Hiss, 107 F. Supp.
128, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 201 F.2d 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942
(1953).
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the newly discovered evidence rule go so far as to hold that evidence which
possibly could exonerate the defendant will not entitle him to a new trial
unless the court is satisfied that there was a lack of knowledge of this
evidence at the time of the trial and that the moving party was diligent
in his attempts to discover it. 19 The effect of the holding in the instant
case is the same as the result obtained under the newly discovered evidence
rule, since, under this court's handling of the case, it is immaterial whether
or not the jury would have convicted absent the perjured testimony. The
policy which apparently motivates the pronouncement of such a severe rule
in the newly discovered evidence cases is a desire to prevent delay, endless
litigation, and expense caused by a defendant's negligent or intentional
non-production of vital evidence. In addition, this doctrine gives the
courts a more expeditious method of circumventing sham ancillary at-
tacks. O Where newly discovered evidence is involved, the defendant
may have the proof at his disposal; or if the evidence is not, in fact, obtain-
able, he has the ability to make the requisite efforts to produce it. The
same is not true with perjury which the defendant first hears at trial.
Hence he cannot be forearmed to meet the falsehood, whereas it is unusual
that a defendant's initial opportunity to find newly discovered evidence
arises during the trial. Even if defendant were able to present evidence
refuting the perjury, his choice is only whether or not to attempt to combat
a force which the opposition has set into motion. The positive act making
possible an unjust decision is the responsibility of the prosecution. No
similar fault on the part of the prosecution appears in cases involving
newly found evidence. For another reason, the requirement of diligence
is more easily rationalized in cases of newly discovered evidence than in
cases involving perjured testimony; there is less likelihood of improper con-
viction in the former case than in the latter. In the newly discovered
evidence cases, even though new evidence is offered which might, if ac-
cepted, lead to an acquittal, at least there has already been a showing in
the record of sufficient valid evidence to prove defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. But under the rule of the instant case where perjured
testimony is involved, the defendant may stand convicted on a record, which
admittedly contains incompetent evidence that had an effect on the con-
viction as yet undetermined. Therefore, it would seem that the Martin
rule is more in accord with our traditional sense of justice than the rule
of the instant case, and nothing more should be required of the defendant
before granting him a new trial than that he show that there was material
perjury in the absence of which he might have been acquitted.
19. Johnson v. United States, 32 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1929); United States v.
Malfetti, 117 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 213 F2d 728 (3d Cir. 1954); see
Brandon v. United States, 190 F.2d 175, 178 (9th Cir 1951) ; United States v. Fox,
95 F. Supp. 315, 319 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
20. See State v. Chadwell, 94 Kan. 302, 305, 146 Pac. 420, 421 (1915) ; Powell
v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 741, 752, 112 S.E. 657, 660 (1922).
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Internal Revenue-
LOSS ON SALE OF BONDS DEDUCTIBLE AS BUSINESS
EXPENSE RATHER THAN CAPITAL LOSS
Pursuant to the terms of a contract with a Finnish governmental
agency, taxpayer was required to purchase and place U.S. Government
bonds in escrow as security for its performance. Upon their release the
bonds were immediately sold at a loss for which the taxpayer claimed a
deduction as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense.' The Com-
missioner contended that the transaction resulted in a capital loss and dis-
allowed the deductior 2  The Tax Court, holding for the taxpayer, found
that the bonds were acquired solely to comply with the provisions of the
contract, and there was no intention to make an investment.3 On appeal,
the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the transaction viewed as a whole
was an "ordinary and necessary" incident in the company's regular busi-
ness and, therefore, the loss was properly deductible as a business expense.
Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
not auth., 5 CCH 1955 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1 51104.
Since the initial enactment of the Internal Revenue Code, Congress
always has permitted deductions from gross income and has taxed only
net income.4 The deductions allowed are those which normally are in-
curred in the production of income in a taxpayer's trade or business. Inas-
much as the loss in the instant case was sustained in consequence of ful-
filling a requirement of a contract in the course of the taxpayer's business,
it is in the nature of an allowable deduction. However, the current judicial
interpretation of the code follows the doctrine that deductions are a matter
of "legislative grace." 1 Thus it is a prerequisite to the allowance of a
deduction for this loss0 that Congress shall have made provision for it.
Provision is made for the deduction of two classes of losses: 7 an ordinary
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §23(a) (1), 53 STAT. 12 (now INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 162(a)). There are no substantive changes in the new code. See H.R. REP:No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A43 (1954); SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
196 (1954).
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(g), 53 STAT. 13 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§165(f); id. § 117(d) (1), as amended, 53 STAT. 869 (1939) (now INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 1211(a)). There are no substantive changes in the new code. See H.R.
REi. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A46, A273 (1954); SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 198, 431 (1954).
3. Bagley & Sewall Co., 20 T.C. 983 (1953), nonacq., 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 6.
4. Griswold, An Argument Against The Doctrine That Deductionws Should Be
Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1142, 1144
(1943).
5. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
6. The court treated the problem as one dealing with the deduction of an ordi-
nary and necessary business expense under § 23(a) (1). See note 1 supra.
However, since the code treats losses and expenses differently it would seem improper
to classify as an expense a deficit resulting from a disappearance of value attributable
to a realization on a sale of an amount less than cost Therefore, it is clear that
the deficit realized in the instant case should be treated as a loss.
7. Int Rev. Code of 1939, § 23, 53 STAT. 12-16 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 161-75). There are no substantive changes in the new code affecting this case.
See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. A43-A59 (1954); SEN. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 195-218 (1954).
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loss sustained by the taxpayer during the taxable year is fully deductible,
whereas the deduction of a loss on the sale of a capital asset is limited, in
the case of a corporation, to the extent of all capital gains realized in the
year of the loss.9 Therefore, it is explicit that a determination must first
be made as to whether the property whose sale resulted in a loss is a capital
asset, which is defined as all property held by the taxpayer with certain
enumerated exceptions.10 Since the bonds in the instant case do not fit
within the language of any of the exceptions," a literal interpretation of
the statute requires that they receive the treatment prescribed for a capital
asset. In prior cases involving property purchased as a necessary incident
in the taxpayer's business, the courts, when they felt that the taxpayer
should not be denied the benefit of a full deduction for a loss, have ex-
panded the language of one of the capital asset exceptions 12 to exempt the
property involved from that treatment. 13 In the instant case, rather than
excessively broadening the meaning of the words which define a capital
asset, the court adopted the novel, but improper, approach of treating the
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(f), 53 STAT. 13 (now INT. Ray. CoDE oF 1954,
§ 165 (a)).
9. See note 2 supra.
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §117(a) (1), as amended, 64 STAT. 932-33 (1950).
(now INT. Ray. CoDE oF 1954, § 1221). A capital asset is "property held by the
taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not in-
clude--
"(A) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the
taxable year, or property held by a taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of his trade or business;
"(B) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject
to the allowance for depreciation provided in Section 23(1), or real property used
in his trade or business."
Subsections C and D are inapplicable to the present problem. The only sub-
stantive change intended is the insertion of a new paragraph relating to certain
accounts and notes receivable. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A273-74
(1954); SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 431-32 (1954).
11. See note 10 supra.
12. The principal exception was that which excludes "property held
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(a) (1), as amended, 64 STAT. 932-33 (1950) (now
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221). For a complete discussion of the problems created
by this exception see Miller, Tlw "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critiquw of Capital
Gains Taxation, 59 YALE L.J. 837, 848-78 (1950).
13. For example, in Joe B. Fortson, 47 B.T.A. 158 (1942), acq., 1942-2 Cum.
BULL. 7, the board held that bonds received as compensation were held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, and, therefore, the loss realized
on their sale was fully deductible as an ordinary loss. However, since that pro-
vision was inserted to exclude from capital assets, property held as inventory, it is
inapposite when applied to such bonds. See also the following cases where the courts
have held that the properties involved were not capital assets. Hogg v. Allen, 105
F. Supp. 12 (M.D. Ga. 1952), aff'd in part sub nor. Edwards v. Hogg, 214 F.2d 640
(5th Cir. 1954) ; Western Wine & Liquor Co., 18 T.C. 1090 (1952) (shares of a dis-
tillery purchased to acquire liquor) ; Hercules Motors Corp., 40 B.T.A. 999 (1939),
noiacq., 1940-1 Cum. Buu.m 7 (trade acceptances received for goods sold). But ef.
those cases in which the courts have held that the properties involved were capital
assets. Exposition Souvenir Corp. v. Commissioner, 163 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1947) (sale
of debentures purchased to secure World's Fair concessions) ; Rockford Varnish Co.,
9 T.C. 171 (1947) (notes received for goods sold).
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loss as a business expense,14 thereby obviating the necessity of consider-
ing the capital asset status of the bonds.' 5
Prior to the enactment of special tax treatment for capital assets,
owners of property held for purposes other than resale were reluctant
to sell since a large portion of any gain realized during the period the
property was held would be lost through taxation at progressive rates.16
As a result, investment capital, rather than having the mobility desired
by Congress, had become frozen, thereby limiting the supply of capital
necessary for economic progress and depriving the Treasury of any revenue
from its accretion.' 7  It also was believed that an equitable method to tax
gains realized over a period of years would be in a manner that would ap-
proximate the tax which would have been paid if the gain had been realized
ratably over the period the property was held.'8 Capital asset treatment
was designed to promote these ends by limiting the effect of the progressive
taxation of gains realized on the sale of certain assets.'9 Originally, a loss
realized on the sale of these assets was deductible in full 2 0 on the theory
that such treatment would lessen a disinclination to invest.2 ' However,
holders of securities then found it advantageous to sell their property after
a price decline to realize a deductible loss and later reacquire similar in-
vestments after the "wash sales" period had elapsed 2 Congress, after a
14. See note 6 supra.
15. The instant case recently has been cited as authority in Tulane Hardwood
Lumber Co., CCH TAx CT. REP. 21258 (Sept. 30, 1955), where the court permitted the
deduction of a loss on debentures, purchased to insure a source of supply, as a busi-
ness expense or a business loss under § 23. The tax court based its holding on the
language of the instant case "'. . . that business expense, Section 23, has been
many times determined by business necessity without a specific consideration of
Section 117." Id. at 3071. By following the instant case, the court completely
disregarded the provisions relating to that property in Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§23(k)(2), 53 STAT. 13-14 (now INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, § 165(g)). There are
no substantive changes in the new code relating to this case. See H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A46 (1954); Sun. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
198 (1954).
16. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921). For a detailed
discussion of legislative history of capital assets, see Wells, Legislative History of
Treatment of Capital Gains Under the Federal Inwome Tax, 1913-48, 2 NAeL TAX
J. 12 (1949).
17. See SuN. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5-7 (1938); H.R. REP. No.
350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921); H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
7 (1938).
18. Wells, supra note 16, at 20; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Revision
of Revenue Laws of the House Ways and Meais Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
38-39 (1934); SEN. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1934). See note
17 supra.
19. See H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921); SEN. REP. No.
558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13 (1934); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Re-
vision of Revenue Laws of the House Ways and Mean Committee, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 38-43 (1938). See also H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 33 (1938).
20. Revenue Act of 1921, §206, 42 STAT. 232-33 (1921).
21. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 33 (1938).
22. H.R. REP. No. 1388, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 2 (1923); see Sacyz TREAS.
ANN. REP. 14 (1922).
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consideration of these factors, limited the deduction of losses on all capital
assets in order to safeguard the revenue.2
However, it was found that the limitation on the deduction of capital
losses was inhibiting the disposal of depreciable property used in a tax-
payer's business, even though otherwise it was economically sound to re-
place such assets with more efficient ones.2 To remedy this situation,
Congress amended the definition of a capital asset to exclude entirely such
depreciable property so that a loss thereon would be fully deductible.2
But this exclusion meant that a gain on the sale of this property would
be taxed progressively, a result contrary to the original reason for defining
this property as a capital asset. In order to solve this dilemma, a hybrid
classification was later enacted to provide that if there was a gain on the
net result of transactions in depreciable property used in a taxpayer's
business it will be taxed as a capital gain, while a loss will be taxed as an
ordinary loss.
26
The rationale behind the allowance of a full deduction for losses on the
sale of depreciable property used in business is inapplicable to the bonds
in the instant case. However, there are other legitimate reasons why the
loss in the instant case should be deductible to a greater extent than the
code specifies. Inasmuch as the fear of lost revenue resulting from a greater
deduction of capital losses has been the sine qua non in determining that
capital loss deductions must be limiteda2 and this fear stems principally
from transactions in securities held for investment, it has little merit when
treating securities held as a necessary incident in a taxpayer's business.
It seems unlikely that securities so held will be susceptible to "tax sales" 28
in order to create losses. If the taxpayer does manipulate these securities
in such a manner, the courts should have no difficulty in determining that
the securities were no longer held as a necessary incident in the business.
Furthermore, the amount of revenue lost by affording such securities
greater loss deduction will be insignificant in terms of the national revenue
picture. With this factor aside, the considerations of easing the burden
of a capital loss in order to lessen a disinclination to purchase securities
necessary to a business transaction and of giving the taxpayer, as a matter
of fairness, the benefit of deducting a loss where a gain on the same trans-
23. Revenue Act of 1934, § 117(d), 48 STAT. 715, see Sm. REP. No. 558, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934) ; Wells, supra note 16, at 24.
24. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Revision of Revemw Laws of the
House Committee on Ways and Means, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 42-43 (1938).
25. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(a), 53 STAT. 50 (now Imr. Rxv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1221).
26. To ease administrative difficulties, the same treatment was also provided
for real property used in a taxpayer's business. Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 117(a) (1),(j), added by 56 STAT. 846 (1942), as amended, 64 STAT. 932-33 (1950)
(now INT. PREV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1221, 1231). There are no substantive changes
in the new code affecting this case. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
A273, A275 (1954); SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 431, 433 (1954).
27. See text at notes 21-23 suPra.
28. See text at note 22 supra.
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action would be taxed,29 indicate that a loss on these securities should be
fully deductible. However, until Congress acts to grant this relief, the
courts should not take it upon themselves to grant relief other than as the
code provides.30
If Congress acts to remedy this problem, an enlightened treatment for
capital losses should provide separate deductions for each class of property
defined as capital assets. Such factors as opportunities for "tax sales, '"
need to encourage modernization of property, disinclination to invest, or
potential revenue possibilities will vary in importance with each class of
capital assets with the result that differing degrees of loss deduction will
be called for. Since the rationale behind defining different types of prop-
erty as capital assets was the uniform treatment to be accorded gains on
such property,31 a uniform provision for the deduction of capital losses is
not necessarily required.
32
29. Undoubtedly this factor has been considered by the courts which have not
been slow to grant extra-statutory relief in cases involving this class of property.
See cases cited in note 13 supra.
30. Instant case at 947, 950 (dissenting opinion).
31. See text at notes 16-19 supra.
32. Up to this time, when Congress wanted to allow a full deduction for a capital
loss on certain property, it has eliminated the classification of that property as a
capital asset in order to permit the loss to be deductible as an "ordinary loss" and
has provided that the gain be taxed as "capital gain." See text at notes 24-26 supra.
This has led to a criticism of such treatment as being inconsistent because it was
reasoned that a gain or loss on the same property should be given exclusively
"capital" or exclusively "ordinary" treatment. See H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 45, 91 (1950). Apparently the criticism is directed at the labels, rather than
the substantive treatment. Since there are valid policy arguments for the treatment
given, regardless of the label, the provisons should be retained. However, there
appears to be no reason why the same result cannot be accomplished by the simpler
method of providing varying deductions for capital losses. Such treatment also
may lessen the opposition of those who object on the grounds of inconsistency.
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